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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Kremlin judicial reforms draw fire from procuracy 
Last fall, President Putin established a commission within the presidential 
administration to review judicial procedures and present a scheme for judicial 
reform. Dmitri Kozak, a deputy head of the administration and close associate of 
the president, heads up the commission, which recently has presented its 
program for reforms. The Kozak commission's proposals focus on the central role 
and authority of judges, and this has infuriated the procurator-general's office. 
 
The Kozak commission will be presenting a series of codes and legislative 
initiatives aimed at making judges more independent and insulated, such as the 
grant of lifetime legal immunity, hoping this independence will not result in the 
spread of corruption. The commission also is proposing judicial pay increases, as 
well as the inclusion of scholars and non-practicing members of the legal 
community on oversight and disciplinary boards as hedges against corrupting 
influences. The plan is designed to span six years and cost R29 billion. 
(ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 17 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0417, via World News 
Connection) 
 
Strengthening the role of judges, however, leads to a lessening of the authority of 
prosecutors in the Russian system, and the procurator-general's office is 
protesting loudly the Kozak commission's plans. Sabir Kekhlerov, a deputy 
prosecutor-general who took part in the Kozak commission meetings, held a 
news conference to criticize the reforms, claiming "Better a bad old Code of 
Criminal Procedure than a bad new one." (MOSCOW NEWS, 25 Apr 01; via 
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lexis-nexis) He also revealed that, during the commission's deliberations, his was 
often the lone or minority dissenting opinion. 
 
The procurator-general himself launched the most vicious broadside against the 
commission's plan, however. In his remarks before the Duma, Vladimir Ustinov 
unexpectedly attacked the Kremlin (or the Kozak faction within it) by scoffing at 
the reforms as the work of those who "merely copy Western models, saying 
these are the best and latest innovations." (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 26 Apr 
01; Agency WPS, via lexis-nexis) 
 
Ustinov further claimed that a new state "economic redistribution" was being 
planned, referring specifically to two companies closely linked to the Kremlin: 
Gazprom and Unified Energy Systems (UES). He immediately followed that 
reference with a charge of corruption: "[O]nly the prosecutor's office prevents 
some dishonest people from doing certain things, and this is why attempts are 
being made to remove the prosecutor's office from the scene." 
 
Ustinov very well may be correct in his assessment of the Kremlin's reform plan. 
It may be intended to prevent the prosecutor's office from conducting some of the 
sputtering investigations of high-level political officials that have marked the last 
several years. The Kremlin almost certainly does not want the kind of legal light 
shining on the books of Gazprom and UES that have buried Media-MOST, and 
perhaps Ustinov is the kind of corruption-busting reformer who would take on 
those battles. The procurator-general's office, however, has not held that role in 
the recent past and appears to be in need of some reform and curtailment of its 
authority. More likely, though, the Kremlin has a video somewhere with Ustinov's 
name on it, and I think he just insured we'll all see it soon. 
 
GOVERNMENT 
Tax police to strengthen legal foundation 
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After a meeting with President Putin, Mikhail Fradkov, the director of the Federal 
Tax Police Service, announced a new set of priorities to strengthen the hand of 
the Tax Police in their fight against tax-evading businesses. Fradkov reported 
that the president has set three priorities for the service: 1) To define its position 
among law enforcement agencies (and presumably eliminate overlapping 
jurisdictions); 2) Not to interfere with legitimate businesses and "not... [to] put 
personal gains above state interests" (corruption in the ranks may have already 
become a problem); and 3) To work out the relationship among the service, the 
economic ministries and the legislature. (INTERFAX, 1724 GMT, 20 Apr 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-0420, via World News Connection) 
 
It sounds a bit as if the Tax Police may have been stepping on some toes and 
now needs to define its role in policing and economics policy and enforcement. 
The result of this reordering should reveal the president's level of confidence with 
this organization. 
  
UES shareholders vote 
The headline result of the UES shareholders meeting on 28 April is a change to 
the company charter that will now allow the shareholders to dismiss UES Chief 
Anatoli Chubais by a simple majority vote (50% plus one share) rather than the 
previously required 75% vote. The shareholders also endorsed changes to 
expand the authority of the Board of Directors in participation with other 
commercial organizations and to determine policy on subsidiaries and dependent 
companies, previously the competence of the company's management. 
(INTERFAX BUSINESS REPORT, 28 Apr 01; via lexis-nexis) 
 
The new Board of Directors includes: the head of the Presidential Administration, 
Aleksandr Voloshin; Trade Minister German Gref; Deputy Property Relations 
Minister Sergei Kosarev; Deputy PM and Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin; 
Deputy Energy Minister Viktor Kudryavy; Head of the Fuel and Energy 
Commission, Georgi Kutovoi; Governor of the Vologda Region Vyacheslav 
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Pozgalyev; Governor of Novgorod Region Mikhail Prusak; Anti-Trust Minister Ilya 
Yuzhanov; and UES Chief Anatoli Chubais. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
SECURITY SERVICES 
The 'war on drugs'... 
The trial of the American Fulbright student, John Edward Tobin, arrested on 1 
February 2001, was held between 24 and 27 April. He is charged with selling 
drugs, luring more than two persons into addiction and keeping a drug den. The 
process at the Leninsky District Court in Voronezh was open but, on the first day, 
Mr. Tobin asked the press to leave the courtroom. He was sentenced to a term of 
three years and one month, to be served in a foreigners' jail in the Mordovia 
region, but Judge Tatyana Korchagina said that she expects him to file an appeal 
by 3 or 4 May. (INTERFAX, 28 Apr 01; via lexis-nexis, and ITAR-TASS, 1500 
GMT, 24 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0424, via World News Connection) Russian 
media have speculated that Mr. Tobin's attendance at a intelligence-related 
academic institution, the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, CA, may have 
contributed to his arrest, or that some cooperation with the Russian special 
services has eased his sentence, which could have been as high as 15 years in 
prison. (INTERFAX, 24 Apr 01; via lexis-nexis) 
 
...'espionage'... 
The trial of Igor Sutyagin, an employee of the Moscow Institute of the United 
States and Canada charged with high treason in the form of espionage, has 
resumed in Kaluga. (ITAR-TASS, 0904 GMT, 24 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0424, 
via World News Connection) 
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Russian citizen V.E. Ojame was accused of cooperation with the British and 
Estonian special services, found guilty of state treason in the form of espionage 
under Article 275 of the Russian Criminal Code, and sentenced to seven years of 
imprisonment and confiscation of property. (INTERFAX, 28 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0423, via World News Connection) 
 
Valentin Danilov, the Russian space engineer arrested in Krasnoyarsk on spying 
charges, is suspected of passing information acquired in his work on projects at 
the Krasnoyarsk State University to the Chinese, thereby enabling them to 
develop new radiation shielding for satellite construction 15 years earlier. This 
case differs from other recent cases in that he is accused of spying for a non-
Western country, and he is charged with fraud for transferring a large part of the 
$350,000 payment he received to a bogus company and cashing the money. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1513 GMT, 24 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0424, via World News 
Connection) 
 
Two Russian naval officers belonging to the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky garrison 
have been arrested for trying to sell components from the nuclear power plant of 
a nuclear submarine. The results of the investigation will determine whether there 
will be a trial. (ITAR-TASS, 1137 GMT, 23 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0423, via 
World News Connection) 
 
...'anti-terrorism'... 
At a Federal Security Services (FSB) briefing in St. Petersburg, FSB director 
Nikolay Patrushev declared that up to 1,500 guerrillas currently operate in 
Chechnya. Included in their operations are the recent bomb attack on the 
Gudermes criminal police building in which six policemen were killed and five 
others injured, the murder of three policemen and two civilians in the village of 
Daba-Yurt in the Argun Gorge in Chechnya, and the murder of Adam [Shamalu] 
Deniev, Chechen leader Akhmed Kadyrov's special envoy to the Middle East, 
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who is credited with counteracting anti-Russian propaganda and reducing the 
inflow of funds to rebels. (Deniev, a known FSB collaborator, took part in the 
illegal arrest and detention of Radio Liberty correspondent, Andrei Babitsky.) 
According to Patrushev, "anti-terrorist operations" are now limited to "precision 
strikes on specific terrorist groups." (ITAR-TASS, 1639 GMT, 25 Apr 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0425, via World News Connection, ITAR-TASS, 0738 GMT, 26 Apr 
01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0426, via World News Connection, and ITAR-TASS, 2324 
GMT, 13 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0413, via World News Connection, and ITAR-
TASS, 1511 GMT 18 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0418, via World News 
Connection) At the same briefing, the chief of the FSB directorate for assistance 
programs, General Aleksander Zdanovich, declared that the FSB "has strong 
suspicions" that Rezvan Chitigev, one of the closest associates of the Jordanian 
warlord, Khattab, is an agent of the American Central Intelligence Agency. He 
suggested that the kidnapping of Medecins Sans Frontiers human rights worker 
Kenneth Gluck was related to the alleged Chechen-American intelligence links. 
(RIA, 1205 GMT, 18 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0418, via World News Connection) 
 
...and the media continues 
General Zdanovich also asserted that one of the major threats to national 
security is the propaganda war being waged against Russia by the media. He 
proclaimed: "Today, not only armed international terrorists, but also those holding 
pens in their hands and sitting in front of the computers are acting against 
Russia." In particular, he was disturbed by Radio Liberty's plans to broadcast in 
Chechnya. (INTERFAX, 1145 GMT, 18 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0418, via World 
News Connection) 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Shuffling papers and committees 
The State Duma has been asked to prolong its spring session so that it can 
review a number of important bills concerning taxes, pension reform, labor 
relations, judicial reform and structural reforms in the economy, including banking 
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bills and the Land Code. The Land Code, signed by Prime Minister Mikhail 
Kasyanov and forwarded to the Duma on 26 April, establishes turnover 
procedures for all types of land except farm land. (INTERFAX BUSINESS 
REPORT, 27 Apr 01; via lexis-nexis) 
 
The Duma deputies also are debating some internal structural changes -- 
namely, reviewing the current system of Duma committees and reducing their 
number from 28 to as few as 12, as well as decreasing the number of 
parliamentary commissions (currently 20). These moves, proposed by the leader 
of the People's Deputy Group, Gennady Raikov, face particular opposition 
among the communists. Ivan Melnikov, head of the Duma committee on 
education and science and member of the communist faction, said that there is 
simply "no objective reason" to reorganize the committees. (ITAR-TASS, 1352 
GMT, 20 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0420, via World News Connection) The Unity 
faction is not against reducing the number of commissions, but has proposed that 
discussion of the issue should be postponed until the fall. Faction leader Vladimir 
Pekhtin explained that the idea "deserves attention, but it is untimely," and that 
the Duma's current priorities are "the earliest possible approval of the draft laws 
mentioned in the president's address to parliament." (INTERFAX, 22 Apr 01; via 
lexis-nexis) These reactions are not untimely since the communists are likely to 
lose a number of their leading positions if the committees are organized (now or 
anytime) whereas the Unity faction steadily is consolidating its influence and 
could gain much power if the committees are reorganized next fall.  
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Musical chairs? 
The latest move in Unity's (and the Kremlin's) consolidation of power is the 
agreement, negotiated by their leaders, to create an inter-faction coalition and a 
common coordination council for four centrist deputy associations in the Russian 
State Duma: Unity (Vladimir Pekhtin), Fatherland-All Russia (Yevgeny Primakov) 
and the deputy groups Regions of Russia (Oleg Morozov) and People's Deputy 
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(Gennady Raikov). The coordination council, designed to harmonize the 
associations' stances on issues discussed in the State Duma, will be co-chaired 
by the four leaders. The chairmanship will rotate among them in alphabetical 
order. (INTERFAX, 17 Apr 01; via lexis-nexis) 
 
The melding is supported by regional leaders. The presidents of Bashkortostan 
and Udmurtia, Murtaza Rakhimov and Aleksandr Volkov, spoke favorably of the 
agreement at a news conference held during their business meeting in Ufa. 
Rakhimov declared that "The merger of big, medium and small political parties 
and movements in a powerful moderate bloc is capable of forming a 
counterbalance to the left-wing movement and pacifying political confrontation in 
society." He added that the unification of Fatherland and Unity is a step toward 
the formation of a two- or three-party system that characterizes strong 
democracies. (INTERFAX, 14 Apr 01; via lexis-nexis) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Sarah Miller 
 
Powell-Ivanov meeting: first, second, third time's a charm? 
With former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the White House in 
April and the US State Department's invitation to the Russian foreign minister to 
visit Washington in May, the momentum appears to be building in preparation for 
a possible meeting of the US and Russian presidents in Genoa, Italy during the 
annual July G-8 talks. While the Russian side seems to hold high hopes for these 
upcoming talks, there is little indication that they will do anything more than 
provide a high-profile forum for voicing continuing differences in US and Russian 
interests. 
 
Although both sides have pledged to take a "constructive" approach, Igor Ivanov 
has been particularly effusive on the subject of his 17-18 May meeting in 
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Washington with Powell. The meeting will be their third, and seems to be 
significant only for its location (this time actually in Washington instead of a 
neutral location) and for its timing, only two months prior to the Genoa summit. In 
recent statements, Ivanov appears hopeful that the meeting might somehow 
jumpstart "US-Russian fundamental relations," especially on contentious issues 
such as "strategic stability, START and ABM." (RIA, 0723 GMT, 19 Apr 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0419, via World News Connection) In contrast to Ivanov, Powell's 
remarks have been measured, referring only to Washington's desire to "closely 
work together on security, trade and other issues." (REUTERS, 24 Apr 01; via 
lexis-nexis) 
 
However, every statement out of Moscow or Washington these days seems to 
contain the caveat "serious differences remain." Whether it is the ongoing 
National Missile Defense (NMD) "debate" or arms sales (to "rogue states"), the 
two sides seem no closer to resolving such issues than they were at last year's 
G-8 Okinawa summit. 
 
In the past month, Russian officials have not softened substantially their anti-
NMD stand. In mid-April, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov reiterated 
that if Moscow fails to dissuade the US in Genoa from implementing NMD, 
Russia would consider implementing its own, "inexpensive and sufficiently 
effective response." (INTERFAX, 1253 GMT, 13 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0413, 
via World News Connection) This mirrors statements over the past year in which 
Russia has pledged a variety of vague reciprocal actions in response to NMD. In 
other recent statements, however, Ivanov veiled Russian criticism of the US 
NMD, saying that Russia will "work together [with the US] to detect and evaluate 
the existing threats and heed legitimate US concerns in missile defense" 
[emphasis added]. By "legitimate," Ivanov is referring to the United States' fear of 
the "rogue threat" against which the US says NMD is being built. Russia has 
claimed that such a threat from those states does not exist. 
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Russian officials have not altered their stance on arms sales to "rogue states" 
like Iran either. The foreign ministry continues to defend Russia's right to sell 
arms, saying, "We will not allow anyone, including the United States, to try to 
oust Russia from promising markets on the pretext of combating proliferation... 
since Russia strictly observes international commitments both in the nuclear 
sphere and in the arms trade." (INTERFAX, 1009 GMT, 13 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0413, World News Connection) Moscow has bolstered these statements 
with several current and upcoming visits by dignitaries from a variety of "rogue 
states." Although there are rarely announcements regarding arms cooperation 
with these countries, in the past when Russia has stressed cultivating "economic 
and trade ties," arms sales appeared somewhere on the horizon. 
 
In a particularly weighty development, North Korean President Kim Jong-il's visit 
to Russia was postponed and replaced with an immediate meeting between the 
North Korean defense minister and Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov in 
Moscow. It may be noted that Klebanov usually leads the Russian delegation 
during "strategic partnership" or arms sales negotiations. (REUTERS, 25 Apr 01; 
via lexis-nexis) Even if the Russian-North Korean relationship does not yield any 
sales, most likely due to Pyongyang's inability to pay, the talks are likely to raise 
Washington's anxiety level as Moscow pursues generally closer relations with the 
DPRK. Even Russian papers predicted that "a nervous reaction in Washington is 
guaranteed." (VREMYA, 24 Apr 01; via RussiaToday.com) 
 
In addition to these long-running disputes, other differences also have created 
friction between the US and Russia. While the clamor over the mutual spy 
expulsions earlier this year has diminished, the NTV scandal has caused a new 
uproar in its place. US criticism about Russian treatment of the independent 
media and questions about the future of freedom of speech in Russia elicited a 
terse response from the Russian foreign ministry, which said that US allegations 
"are totally unfounded and false.... anything happening to NTV, Segodnya, and 
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Itogi bears no relation to freedom of speech." (RIA, 0723 GMT, 19 Apr 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0419, via World News Connection.) 
 
As Moscow makes its position known on these contentious issues, it seems to be 
practicing caution on others as July draws near. In particular, Moscow kept its 
distance throughout the US-China standoff in March, and has not yet given its 
usual publicity to the Russian-Chinese Interstate Treaty due to be signed during 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit to Moscow in July. (ITAR-TASS, 0721 
GMT, 20 Apr 01; FBIS-CHI-2001-0420, via World News Connection) 
Furthermore, Russia has not offered any criticism of the proposed US arms sales 
to Taiwan, calling them "a question of bilateral relations." (AGENCE FRANCE 
PRESSE, 25 Apr 01; via lexis-nexis) Perhaps Russia is simply reciprocating a 
similar response from the US on Russian arms sales to China. 
 
The past four months have shown Russian foreign policy makers that patience is 
a virtue. The Bush administration has given no indication that it will open a 
substantive dialogue with Russia at least until the summer, nor has it made any 
promises concerning substance. Washington appears to be aware of the pitfalls 
of premature "summitry." 
 
 
Russian Federation: Media 
By Maria Metcalf 
 
Other outlets now face government clampdown 
The battle for NTV has ended rather quietly with Boris Jordan entering a 
relatively empty NTV building (with private security guards, the Ostankino's FSB 
and police bosses) in the wee hours of the Saturday before Easter, after he said 
the previous day that "no seizure of NTV by force is going to happen," and after 
President Vladimir Putin had said that the courts must settle the dispute and a 
hearing was set for May 17. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 17 Apr 01) However, a 
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Moscow court ruled, before the scheduled hearing, that the NTV takeover was 
legal and that attempts to prevent Jordan from assuming the position of general 
director of NTV were illegal. Now it seems that the government, from the oblasts 
to the Duma, is turning up the heat on the media throughout the country. 
 
Reverberations first were felt within the crumbling Media-MOST empire. Media-
MOST claimed that, on 16 April, the Russian tax police filed tax evasion charges 
against Elen Metlikina, chief accountant for TNT, the small channel still owned by 
Gusinsky that is providing broadcasting capability for NTV exiles. On the same 
day, the newspaper Segodnya was closed. The next day the entire staff of the 
weekly newsmagazine Itogi, including editor Sergei Parkhomenko, were "given a 
two-month paid leave." In other words, they were sacked. Undoubtedly, when the 
staff members return, their jobs will not be waiting for them. After Gazprom fired 
Itogi's editors, the Washington Post Company's Newsweek magazine decided to 
sever ties with the Russian newsmagazine.  
 
Vladimir Gusinsky is likely to lose control of the radio station Ekho Moskvy, which 
is a structural division of Media-MOST. Gazprom already owns a large portion of 
Ekho Moskvy shares. If Gusinsky does not repay his $262 million debt to 
Gazprom by July 2001, the gas monopoly will receive 25 percent of the shares 
and thus will gain controlling interests. (STRANA.RU, 18 Apr 01; via Johnson's 
Russia List) 
 
The subsequent week, officers of the main military prosecutor's office searched 
the apartment of Valery Shiryaev, deputy general director of the biweekly 
newspaper Novaya gazeta. Although officials declared that the search was 
related to the criminal case against Media-MOST's headquarters, the newspaper 
had investigated corruption in several state agencies, such as the security 
services and the prosecutor general's office. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 
27 Apr 01) Novaya gazeta, which purportedly had released information on the 
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government case against Media-MOST, remains the most highly regarded 
independent Russian-language newspaper. 
 
On 26 April a group of armed men took over the offices of the Moskovya 
television company. Although the channel is 44-percent owned by the Moscow 
Oblast government, a 56-percent stake was sold to a company called Television 
Technical Center in 1999. The takeover occurred in much the same manner as in 
the case of NTV. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 27 Apr 01) 
 
Business as usual 
Spanish courts ruled on 18 April not to extradite Gusinsky, referring to 
"questionable circumstances and peculiarities" in the prosecutor general's case 
against him. The Spanish prosecutors decided not to appeal the decision of the 
lower court. Immediately after the court decision, Gusinsky announced that he 
had no interest in NTV since Gazprom had taken control, and that he intended to 
sell his stake to the Ukrainian oligarch, Vadim Rabinovich. A successful and 
powerful businessman like Gusinsky, Rabinovich differs from the Russian in one 
very important way: He enjoys very close relations with Ukrainian President 
Leonid Kuchma. 
 
Meanwhile, in order to prevent someone like Ted Turner from ever threatening 
the Kremlin's control of the media in Russia, the Duma voted 332 to 22 to 
approve on first reading a bill that prohibits foreign investor ownership of more 
than 50 percent of electronic and print media (only a week after the Duma 
approved on first reading a bill on Martial Law!). Although any possibility of a deal 
between Ted Turner's investment consortium and Gusinsky for a 30-percent 
stake in Media-MOST has long since been extinguished, if the bill ultimately were 
passed it would affect other media. The bill contains a clause of retroactive force, 
so foreign owners would have to sell their shares to Russian companies within a 
year. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 27 Apr 01) The main target of such a 
bill would be the mostly Dutch-owned publishing house, Independent Media, 
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which produces the English-language newspaper The Moscow Times, the 
Russian-language newspaper Vedemosti and the Russian-language versions of 
Playboy, Cosmopolitan and other magazines. Such a bill by the Duma would 
constitute an ominous message to any investor. The deputy chairman of the 
Duma and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, 
didn't want to wait for the bill to be passed to deliver such a message. He was 
quoted on 17 April as saying, "it's a good thing they are closing down NTV. Other 
channels should be closed as well, you are all offspring of the American CIA...we 
do not need democracy, democracy will ruin the country." (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 
19 Apr 01)  
 
Additionally, the Russian Duma speaker is against American radio broadcasting 
in Caucasian languages. 
 
Has the West woken up? 
Since the anti-climactic Gazprom takeover of NTV, European leaders have joined 
the US in expressing concern for the anti-democratic implications of the state-run 
gas company controlling a once-independent television station. State Department 
spokesman Richard Boucher said that the United States was "extremely 
troubled" by the takeover and that Media-MOST outlets were "clear targets of a 
series of extraordinary pressures from law enforcement and other elements of 
the Russian government." German Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher said that the 
observation of press freedom was a "decisive yardstick for democracy in Russia." 
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 19 Apr 01) French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine said 
that the French government is "disappointed and worried," about the Gazprom 
media coup and the closure of Segodnya and Itogi. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 20 Apr 
01) While no country has claimed that Putin is responsible directly for NTV's loss 
of independence, at last the West is expressing the sentiment that the case was 
a test of Putin's personal commitment to media freedom. 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Richard Miller 
 
Inter-service debate shaping up for funding in the reform effort 
The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (MoD) sent strong signals in the 
past two weeks that further significant personnel changes are on hold while the 
ministry concentrates efforts on carrying through the ongoing military reform 
tasks at hand. However, while the statements from the defense minister and 
senior MoD staff exude a spirit of cooperation and harmony, individual 
statements and reports concerning the three main branches (ground, navy and 
air forces) point to an inevitable clash over scarce defense funding for competing 
service-oriented priorities. 
 
The first personnel indicator came from the first deputy chief of the General Staff, 
General Valery Manilov, on 14 April when he admitted the previous tension 
between the chief of the General Staff, General Anatoly Kvashnin, and the 
previous defense minister, Igor Sergeev, but then went on to say that none of 
that animosity would affect the relationship with the new defense minister, 
Sergey Ivanov. "[They have] a good mutual understanding and they are working 
side by side, carrying out the same task," Manilov said of the cooperation 
between Kvashnin and Ivanov. (INTERFAX, 0935 GMT, 14 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0414, via World News Connection) Two days later, Ivanov himself flatly 
denied rumors that he was preparing imminently to dismiss Kvashnin by stating 
the general's resignation is "not being planned or expected." Ivanov added that 
all deputy defense minister appointments are completed and "we have a 
coherent team. We are ready to work to implement the decisions adopted by the 
President in the beginning of the year with regard to military reform." (ITAR-
TASS, 1702 GMT, 16 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0416 via World News 
Connection)  
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Speaking in Minsk on 17 April, Ivanov broadly discussed some aspects of these 
reform efforts. He sketched out some ideas on restructuring Russian military 
districts, stated that Russia will move to a military structure centered on three 
main forces -- ground, air and sea -- and hinted at the reform goals for two of 
them -- Air Force and Navy: 
 
Air Force: "to enable the peacetime groupings to fulfill the tasks of containing 
armed conflicts." 
 
Navy: "The efficiency of the Navy is expected to be enhanced by combining and 
disbanding control agencies performing the same functions, and by scrapping 
obsolete armaments and ships." (INTERFAX, 1319 GMT, 17 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0417, via World News Connection) 
 
In theory, these reform goals truly may indicate the MoD leadership's intention in 
developing the Russian military; however, statements and plans from individual 
service leaders point to more expansive, and expensive, development plans. 
 
The commander of the Russian Navy, Admiral Vladimir Kuroedov, said that 
Russia should support his desire to have 12-15 strategic missile submarines 
(SSBNs), 50 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and 35 diesel 
submarines, as well as some 70 ocean-going surface combatants. Kuroedov 
stated this while touring the Severodvinsk Shipyard, Russia's largest submarine 
builder, earlier this month. At the shipyard, he was briefed on construction 
progress for Russia's first fourth-generation SSBN, the Borey Class (Project 955) 
submarine and visited an Akula II Class (Type 971M) SSN which is undergoing 
final trials before being turned over to the Navy in July. Kuroedov also confirmed 
that the Kiev Class aircraft carrier, Admiral Gorshkov, will be repaired for sale to 
the Indian Navy and the Kirov Class battle cruiser, Admiral Nakhimov, will be 
repaired for re-commissioning in the Russian Navy. Furthermore, the Russian 
Navy is planning to start construction of the new Project 20380 corvettes, which 
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will be used for coastal patrol, escort and antisubmarine warfare operations. The 
first class of 1900-ton ships is scheduled to be laid down at the Severnaya Verf 
shipyard in St. Petersburg later this year. Kuroedov said that, to achieve these 
goals, the Russian Navy should receive no less than 25% of the defense budget 
(increased from its current share of approximately 12%). (JANE'S DEFENCE 
WEEKLY, 18 Apr 01)  
 
The commander of the Russian Air Force, General Anatoly Kornukov, previously 
outlined comprehensive plans for rebuilding Russian air power. (See THE NIS 
OBSERVED, 21 Mar 01) These plans, when coupled with the Russian Air Force 
Armaments Department's announcement last week that over 60% of Russian 
military aircraft have exceeded their service life estimates, will create 
considerable requirements for spending and be in direct competition with similar 
goals by the other services. (INTERFAX, 0748 GMT, 22 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0422, via World News Connection) 
 
The newly appointed commander of the ground forces, General Nikolai 
Kormiltsev, recently stated that Moscow plans to be able to fight "in two or three 
strategic areas." He further alluded to "hot spots" like the Caucasus and Central 
Asia as some of these strategic interest areas. If the past and current Russian 
efforts in Chechnya are any indication, their ability to fight decisively and win in 
two to three similar conflicts will also require significant investment in the 
conventional ground forces. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 23 Apr 01) This effort will 
reach far beyond the current attempts merely to fix the financial distribution 
methods and pay scales that often fail to compensate the soldiers in this combat 
zone, contributing to the higher desertion rates. 
 
All three of these military services have competing views of military reform and 
development that will compete also for the same scarce funding. If the numerous 
Russian statements about reacting to a US National Missile Defense (NMD) 
system through increased Russian nuclear offensive capability (more warheads 
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on more rockets) are serious, this will complicate further the theater forces reform 
which is currently planned largely at the expense of the strategic forces. Russia's 
immediate neighbors should be concerned about another message that is 
discerned easily in these comments: The military leadership is rethinking the 
nature and organization of conventional forces and where they might become 
operational. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Back to crawling? Or forward to walking? 
This past year, Ukraine took its first small steps out of infancy. After a decade of 
seemingly arrested development, the country finally began toddling toward its 
goal of a liberal, Western-style democracy based on law and regulation. Reduced 
wage and pension arrears, realistic efforts to deal with the country's debts, GNP 
growth and attempts to diminish the shadow economy, signaled progress, even if 
adulthood was still too far away to imagine. The decision by parliament on 26 
April to oust Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko and his reform-oriented cabinet 
could provide the country with an important growth spurt or condemn it to return 
to its amoebic state. In many ways, which of these paths lies in store for the 
country will depend on the deposed prime minister. How much of a difference 
one man can truly make, however, is an important question. 
 
Just hours after seeing the parliament vote no confidence in his cabinet, 
Yushchenko announced that he would become a candidate in the upcoming 
parliamentary elections and that his main task would be uniting a "broad front" of 
people "for the sake of a democratic Ukrainian idea." (THE INDEPENDENT, 28 
Apr 01; via lexis-nexis) The vote, he suggested, actually might be a positive step 
for Ukraine. "I am optimistic," he told reporters, "because today lots of democratic 
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forces were able to hear the bell they couldn't hear before. You have to fight for 
transparent politics and a non-criminal economy and democracy. If we want to 
have it, we have to fight for it." (WASHINGTON POST, 29 Apr 01; via lexis-nexis) 
Yet Yushchenko was careful to make it clear that the broad democratic coalition 
he envisaged would be "mainly oriented at a unifying notion and not against 
somebody." That somebody is, of course, President Leonid Kuchma, whose 
alleged involvement in the death of journalist Georgy Gongadze ignited the most 
rancorous protests in Ukraine since the country's independence. Although these 
protests -- organized by several opposition political parties -- failed to gain major 
popular support, the Gongadze issue paralyzed the work of parliament and 
indirectly led to Yushchenko's removal. 
 
Yushchenko's emphasis on uniting Ukraine's fragmented opposition into a 
positive force for change will no doubt be met enthusiastically by Western 
leaders, who have urged just that for months now. Many in the opposition's rank-
and-file, meanwhile, have reacted with jubilation. With Yushchenko leading the 
opposition movement, some suggest, the country finally could begin to develop a 
democratic political and civil society. While this is probably true, whether it is 
possible or not is the real question. 
 
In recent months, Ukraine's government has been paralyzed by the Gongadze 
and Yushchenko affairs. At a critical juncture in Ukrainian independence, 
significant time has been lost. While politicians have been arguing over Kuchma's 
fate and Yushchenko's value, important initiatives for regional Eurasian energy 
and military cooperation have floundered. In addition, Russia has continued with 
plans to build a pipeline bypassing Ukraine, and has used Ukraine's political 
weakness to push for a number of concessions on military and state asset 
questions. In just the last few months, seven major Ukrainian national companies 
have been privatized into Russian hands -- with several of the winning tenders 
appearing suspect, and at least one of them being aggressively opposed by 
Yushchenko. (BALTIMORE SUN, 29 Apr 00; via Yahoo! News)  
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Even more important than the time lost, Ukraine's politicians have shown little 
ability to work together in any long-term constructive manner. Their behavior 
during the no-confidence vote serves as a clear example that Ukraine's political 
development remains in an embryonic state. The "debate" over the future of 
Yushchenko's government included a group of 40 parliamentarians effectively 
holding the rostrum hostage to keep the prime minister's opponents from being 
recognized, an attempted self-immolation, at least one MP drowning out 
speakers by shouting into a megaphone and numerous physical "scuffles." While 
yielding little in terms of substance, the debate was at least interesting for its 
entertainment value. 
 
Immediately following the fall of Yushchenko's cabinet, Ukraine's former deputy 
prime minister and first opposition martyr, Yulia Tymoshenko, came out in 
support of her former boss. When asked whom she would like as the next 
president, she answered quickly. "I would like to see a person who is honest, 
professional, and the people's true choice. Viktor Yushchenko has those 
characteristics. I want Ukraine to have a president it would not be ashamed of." 
(CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 30 Apr 01; via Ukraine Today) Tymoshenko 
stressed her desire to support Yushchenko in lieu of her own presidential 
ambitions. The opposition leader, however, has made similar comments in the 
past, and then reversed herself just days later by suggesting that only she should 
lead the country. Additionally, the fact that her comments came as she was 
announcing her intention to hold a referendum to impeach the president calls into 
question her support of Yushchenko's positive message. It is more than doubtful 
that Yushchenko would ever support such an initiative, and the move lays the 
foundation for a major conflict between the two in the near future. But at least 
Tymoshenko made a supportive statement to the press about Yushchenko. Most 
major political leaders who may have a chance at the presidency in 2004 are 
remaining silent about the fallen prime minister's plans. "Unity" is a nebulous 
concept in Ukraine.  
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While Yushchenko continues trying to tilt at Ukrainian windmills, jockeying 
continues for positions in the new government. With parliamentary elections less 
than one year away, Ukrainian parliamentarians are in no rush to provide any of 
their strongest colleagues with the opportunity to use the cabinet as a campaign 
pulpit. Therefore, the government will probably fall into a holding pattern until 
after the elections -- losing even more time. All the while, Kuchma will remain in 
control of the media and power ministries, doing all he (and his business friends) 
can to limit Yushchenko's possible impact. 
 
Despite Yushchenko's optimism, his removal creates more problems for Ukraine 
than it could possibly fix. Opposition members may welcome the popular prime 
minister to their ranks as their savior, but Ukraine unfortunately needs much 
more than just one man. Until other political leaders choose unity and 
constructive behavior over divisiveness, Ukraine is doomed to continue in its 
status as an under-developed, under-grown little brother. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN 
How close are they to peace? 
The chances for peace are better now than at any time in the last decade, says 
Carey Cavanaugh. He would know. As US special negotiator for the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict since August 1999, he spearheaded the US mediation efforts 
and raised the profile of the nearly defunct OSCE Minsk Group. The presidents 
have arrived at a basic understanding, which is endorsed by the three chief 
mediators who represent France, Russia, and the US. The three will work out the 
particulars and present a proposal to the presidents at the next meeting in 
Geneva in June. Now the presidents must obtain public acceptance of the peace 
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process, and this, according to Cavanaugh, constitutes the biggest obstacle to 
peace. (PRESENTATION to Strengthening Democracy Initiative (SDI), Harvard 
University, 23 Apr 01)  
 
During the first week of April, President Robert Kocharian of Armenia and 
President Haidar Aliev of Azerbaijan arrived at the basic formula while attending 
four days of OSCE-mediated talks in Key West which were hosted by US 
Secretary of State Colin Powell. Then the presidents had individual meetings in 
Washington, DC, with US President George W. Bush. 
 
The parties and the OSCE are keeping the substance of the talks secret, but 
some details have been leaked in a scattered way among different media outlets 
and others can be inferred from the official statements. The Armenian side would 
return six of the occupied seven districts of Azerbaijan outside Nagorno-
Karabakh. This would allow the vast majority of the more than 700,000 
Azerbaijani refugees to return home. According to Azerbaijani Foreign Minister 
Vilayat Guliev, a territorial exchange is not on the agenda, but the retention by 
Armenia of the "Lachin corridor" linking Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh must be 
balanced by a corridor through Armenia from Azerbaijan proper to its non-
contiguous territory, Nakhichevan. In this context, having dismissed the territorial 
swap, it would seem that by "corridor" the parties mean extra-territorial roads. 
(However, in the Lachin region some change of borders in Armenia's favor 
seems to be implied.) As regards status, Cavanaugh says the "common state" 
formula has been discarded and Guliev says that Nagorno-Karabakh will have a 
"high degree of autonomy" but formally remain within Azerbaijan. (REUTERS, 19 
Apr 01; via habarlar-l@usc.edu, and THE ECONOMIST, 21 Apr 01)  
 
The US State Department has announced that the OSCE in the person of Carey 
Cavanaugh is informing Iran about the talks and that a group of experts on 
borders has been summoned. This also suggests that extra-territorial roads are 
under discussion, since a road from Azerbaijan proper to Nakchichevan would 
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have to pass very close to the Iranian frontier, perhaps even running along the 
border where there is a railroad already. If the agreement is signed, restrictions 
on US assistance to Azerbaijan and the trade embargo that Azerbaijan and 
Turkey have imposed on Armenia would be lifted. This would pave the way to 
normalizing relations between Turkey and Armenia. 
 
How to sell the compromise? 
The arrangements discussed above are nothing if not fair: The Armenians are 
guaranteed security and self-rule; the Azerbaijanis retain territorial integrity (at 
least in areas other than Lachin) and obtain a link to Nakhichevan, which 
constitutes an uninterrupted path to Turkey. But these provisions fall far short of 
banners under which the war was fought or the slogans that the demagogues in 
the parliaments and on the streets of Yerevan and Baku still chant. 
 
Persuading the populace in both states that this compromise represents the best 
available outcome requires a degree of openness and public accountability that 
has been woefully lacking. However, the last couple of months witnessed some 
very productive experiments with public discussion. The February publication of 
the outdated draft OSCE texts created a context for debate in Azerbaijan that 
humiliated the opposition, which had no viable alternative to offer. (See THE NIS 
OBSERVED, 28 Feb 01 and 21 Mar 01) 
 
The presidents must trust their publics to be savvy enough to distinguish 
between an opposition that criticizes real flaws in the peace proposals and an 
opposition that only uses the occasion to attack the plan's authors. At the same 
time, the presidents have a very powerful tool -- deniability. The governments 
already have leaked more information than was made available in 1997 and 
1999, the two previous occasions when a compromise seemed imminent. Over 
the next few weeks, the opposition can have its say and, if its representatives 
propose improvements, the governments can modify the proposals before 
making them public. (Ways of ensuring the security of the roads without 
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introducing foreign peacekeepers represents one fruitful area for discussion.) In 
other words, the break before the Geneva meeting provides the presidents with 
an opportunity to steal the thunder from the opposition by appropriating any 
constructive proposals that may emerge. 
 
In 1994, when the cease-fire agreement was signed, both nations were 
exhausted by war. Now they are exhausted by poverty. The international 
community can play a very constructive role by holding out generous financial 
incentives. The Azeri refugees who eked out an existence amid devastating 
squalor need more than the formal right of return; they need services, 
transportation, and shelter. Veterans in both countries lack medical care, 
pensions, and employment. It's not enough to suggest that peace will remove 
obstacles to trade and promote economic recovery. It would be far more 
persuasive to offer an aid package to improve immediately the condition of those 
who suffered the most from the war. 
 
Why isn't Russia misbehaving? 
In his comments at Harvard on 23 April, Cavanaugh emphasized that the three 
mediating countries share a common constructive attitude and are working in 
tandem to develop a concrete proposal. In this context, Cavanaugh mentioned 
that Russia has treaty obligations to help Armenia in the event of a new war over 
Nagorno-Karabakh, but Russia has to contend with its own conflict in the North 
Caucasus. 
 
In March two former Azerbaijani officials, Tofig Zul'fugarov and Eldar Namazov, 
proposed launching limited operations to retake the Armenian-occupied districts 
east of Nagorno-Karabakh. (ZERKALO, 7 Mar 01) Would the armed forces of 
Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia be sufficient to counter such moves? True, 
Russia has bases and thousands of troops in Armenia and it has supplied 
extensive weaponry to Armenia (most recently by moving CFE-limited equipment 
from a base in Georgia to Nagorno-Karabakh). But what if hostilities resumed on 
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such a scale that this was not sufficient? Would reinforcements from Russia be 
available? The Russian military faces another summer of war in Chechnya, 
including mounting rumors of a Chechen counteroffensive. According to the 
preeminent Russian expert on nationalities, Emil Pain, the Russian side is 
running low on reinforcements, whereas the Chechens have the demographic 
resources to fight a guerrilla war for the next 50 years. (PRESENTATION to The 
Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology & Policy, Boston University, 4 Apr 01) 
A second front in the Caucasus seems more than Russia can handle. 
 
It's ironic that for the second time in a decade the South Caucasus is poised to 
reap the benefits of a Chechen war. Nearly two years ago Azerbaijan's elder 
statesman, Vafa Guluzade, resigned his position as foreign policy advisor to 
Aliev in protest over Azerbaijan's lack of support for the Chechens. His words 
ring prophetic now.  
 
"I will tell you right now that if that brave and courageous people in their tiny 
republic (of Chechnya) had not managed to defeat Russia in the 1994-1996 war, 
Moscow would long have been back in Azerbaijan, making further trouble and 
trying to destroy our independence. Our debt to the Chechens is huge -- and yet 
not one voice in this government will speak one word of support or solidarity. 
Silence. I am ashamed, mortified. That is why I quit." (Thomas Goltz, "The 
Question of Succession in Azerbaijan: Is the Aliyev era (almost) Over?" SDI 
CASPIAN STUDIES EXPERTS CONFERENCE REPORT, Oct 99) 
 
Evolution of US policy 
Major improvements in US policy under the present administration constitute the 
second set of factors pushing Russia to support a peaceful and fair solution to 
the impasse over Nagorno-Karabakh. In 1999, in a zealous pursuit of an elusive 
legacy, the Clinton administration abandoned the OSCE process. In the midst of 
the war against Serbia, Madeleine Albright launched the bilateral negotiations 
which were held in total secrecy and left Russian representatives out in the cold. 
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When those talks showed promise, Armenian leaders were murdered in the 
nation's parliament. Then it was Putin's turn to mediate the bilateral talks, then 
Chirac's. In the meantime, the OSCE process languished. In its waning days, the 
Clinton administration made a shameful last-ditch effort by secretly offering a 
deal: It would lift US restrictions on aid to Azerbaijan if Turkey ended its embargo 
of Armenia. (AZTV1, 25 Feb 01; BBC Monitoring, via Habarlar-l@usc.edu) Had 
Azerbaijan accepted that offer, a key bargaining chip in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
settlement would have been squandered. 
 
The Bush administration improved the process substantially by merging the 
bilateral talks with the OSCE mediation. In Key West the main talks were among 
the negotiators and between the negotiators and each of the parties separately. 
The presidents met only once and for only a brief period. This format shares the 
spotlight among the mediators, expedites the process by having the presidents 
on hand to react swiftly, and gives symbolic weight to the proceedings by 
involving top figures from the US administration. 
 
The Bush administration has come under criticism for taking a tougher line in its 
relations with Russia than the previous administration. Yet, in this instance, the 
Bush administration involved the Russian representatives in a cooperative and 
fruitful manner. This administration is said to be weak on foreign policy and 
uninterested in international conflicts. Yet, according to Cavanaugh, on the 10th 
day of the administration President Bush discussed the Nagorno-Karabakh 
quandary with President Chirac; in its 10th week the administration was hosting 
the negotiations in Key West. Azerbaijani embassy sources say that the US 
president himself ran the half-hour meeting with Aliev. Bush exhibited such 
mastery of the complexities of the situation that the Azerbaijani president was 
very satisfied when he left the room. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
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By Lt. Col. James DeTemple 
 
Officials focus on border issues 
Bilateral and multilateral attempts to strengthen border control were topics at the 
meeting of Kyrgyzstan President Askar Akaev and Tajikistan Foreign Minister 
Talbak Nazarov in Bishkek on 13 April; they addressed particularly the presence 
of "terrorist bases" in Tajikistan. The officials are reported also to have dealt with 
border demarcation and economic cooperation in terms of energy, mining and 
transportation. 
 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan remain at loggerheads over the presence of "terrorist 
bases" in Tajikistan's Pamir mountains. Kyrgyzstan has continually warned 
Tajikistan that its territory is being used as a secure base for the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and has cited alarm at the real possibility of 
renewed fighting in the region. The IMU incursions into southern Kyrgyzstan in 
August 2000 purportedly were staged from bases in northern Tajikistan. 
However, Tajikistan has denied vehemently the presence of such bases on its 
territory. Nazarov assured Kyrgyzstan's president that "there are no militants" in 
Tajikistan. (KYRGYZSTAN DAILY DIGEST, 16 Apr 01; via EURASIANET.org) 
The Tajik foreign minister even suggested forming a joint commission that could 
verify there are no IMU insurgents there. (KYRGYZSTAN DAILY DIGEST, 16 Apr 
01; via EURASIANET.org) Such discord needs to be resolved: According to the 
International Crisis Group (a European-based multinational organization dealing 
with conflict prevention), porous borders and unpredictable security relationships 
between the Central Asian states, together with the war in Afghanistan, have 
increased the potential for "inter-state conflict" in the region. Indeed, enhancing 
regional security will depend greatly on the ability of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan -- 
considered by many defense analysts to be the weakest links in the Central 
Asian security system -- to work together more closely on border security.  
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In addition to their bilateral talks, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan discussed border 
security with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia (within the framework of the 
Council for Border Problems) on 17 April in Moscow. While increasing regional 
efforts, the forum, another Russian-led endeavor, undoubtedly will strengthen 
Russia's hand in Central Asian security matters. 
 
Additionally, chiefs of the General Staffs of the Shanghai-5 states -- China, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan -- met in Bishkek on 18-19 April 
to discuss problems of "international terrorism" and drug trafficking, as well as 
the establishment of a joint counter-terrorism center in Bishkek. (NEZAVISIMAYA 
GAZETA, 18 Apr 01; via lexis-nexis) Their military representatives signed a letter 
of intent at the end of the conference to cooperate in fighting terrorism. The 
Shanghai-5 members are expected to sign an "anti-terrorism agreement" at their 
July summit in Moscow. (INTERFAX, 20 Apr 01; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Central Asian security efforts are not limited to regional structures, however. 
Additional support comes from organizations such as the European Union, which 
is investing $3 million in a two-year program to fight drug trafficking in Central 
Asia. The main goal is to stem the flow of narcotics from Central Asia to Western 
Europe. The agenda calls for tighter security control in Almaty, Ashgabat, 
Bishkek and Tashkent as well as the port cities of Aktau, Atyrau and 
Turkmenbashi. Additionally, the program emphasizes improved channels of 
communication between the law enforcement agencies of the five Central Asian 
states and the establishment of a joint information network to coordinate customs 
procedures and border security. (INTERFAX, 11 Apr 01; via EURASIANET.org) 
 
Speaking with a group of European military attaches in Dushanbe on 19 April, 
Tajikistan President Imomali Rakhmonov reiterated his stand that the EU and 
OSCE should play a more prominent role in mediating the Afghan civil war. 
Rakhmonov argued that the "Afghanistan problem" has serious implications for 
European as well as Central Asian security. (TAJIKISTAN DAILY DIGEST, 23 
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Apr 01; via EURASIANET.org) Military attaches from Italy, France, Germany and 
Scandinavian countries have been visiting Tajikistan to observe the Russian 
border force and specialized Tajik units engaged in counter-drug operations. 
These operations have resulted in the seizure of approximately two tons of 
drugs, including 800 kilograms of heroin, in the first quarter of 2001 alone. 
International experts forecast a sharp increase in Afghanistan's drug production 
this year. (ITAR-TASS, 18 Apr; via lexis-nexis) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
What's in your suitcase? 
April was a very good month for the Baltic states and their hopes to join the 
NATO military alliance. Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga may not have 
brought home souvenirs from the Lincoln Memorial, but what she did bring back 
from her 23-30 April trip to Washington is sure to be appreciated even more: 
assurances from President George W. Bush and various senators that the US 
continues to back Baltic integration with NATO and the European Union. As the 
Baltic countries focus on overcoming significant hurdles to joining the alliance 
(obstacles that resulted from several decades of nondevelopment), several 
NATO members in addition to the US also went on record (some, not for the first 
time) as standing in the Baltic corner. Such support is essential, as the 2002 
NATO summit -- at which the states are anticipating an invitation to join -- 
approaches. 
 
At a 23 April White House meeting, President Bush expressed satisfaction with 
Latvia's achievements during the last few years and essentially voiced support 
for integration of the Baltic states into NATO, according to Aiva Rozenberga, the 
Latvian president's spokeswoman. Vike-Freiberga also met with US Vice 
President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Colin Powell, from whom she 
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heard strong reassurance "that Russia would never be given a veto over who is 
or who is not part of NATO and we will examine each country in accordance with 
the conditions and standards put forth." (BNS, 0735 GMT, 24 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0424; via World News Connection) 
 
The Latvian president also received comforting news from Capitol Hill. According 
to Rozenberga, Sen. John McCain and Sen. Gordon Smith, chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations European Affairs Subcommittee, backed the stance 
that the Baltics be invited to join NATO. (LETA, 0810 GMT, 25 Apr 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0425, via World News Connection) 
 
Elsewhere, Spain's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Josep Pique, expressed his 
country's support for Baltic integration as well, during a one-day trip to Riga. He 
downplayed concern over Russia's possible reaction to NATO expansion: "All 
together, we will be able to explain to Russia that NATO enlargement means 
greater security." (LETA, 1234 GMT, 18 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0418, via World 
News Connection) 
 
Poland reiterated its approval of NATO's open-door policy. As he prepared for a 
visit to Vilnius, Polish Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski said, "The 
acceptance of new European members in the alliance would not only strengthen 
NATO, it would expand the zone of peace and stability in Europe and beyond." 
(BNS, 1139 GMT, 18 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0418, via World News 
Connection) 
 
Backing came as well from Luxembourg's prime minister, Jean-Claude Juncker, 
following a meeting with Lithuanian Prime Minister Rolandas Paksas. "In our 
opinion, Lithuania has truly become a guarantee of security, and it naturally 
belongs in NATO," Juncker said. (BNS, 1057 GMT, 23 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0423, via World News Connection) 
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Still, not everyone in the neighborhood favors Baltic accession to the military 
alliance. In a German newspaper interview, Finnish President Tarja Halonen 
expressed serious concern over possible Russian reactions to NATO expansion. 
"We do not want to prevent the Baltic states from joining NATO. . . . Of course 
every independent country is free to make its own decisions but Finland cannot 
support the NATO interests of the Baltic states in the same way as it does their 
integration in the EU. Stability and security in Europe must be seen in a larger 
framework. For this we need Russia. . . . I hope that the NATO leadership is 
sufficiently aware of this," Halonen said. (DER SPIEGEL, 9 Apr 01; FBIS-WEU-
2001-0409, via World News Connection) 
 
However, the Finnish official's underwhelming support later was downplayed by 
the country's defense minister. At talks with Latvian Foreign Minister Indulis 
Berzins, Finnish Defense Minister Jan-Erik Enestam said his (neutral) country 
fully respects Latvia's choice to join NATO but cannot influence the decision on 
Latvia's admission or non-admission to the alliance. (BNS, 1032 GMT, 18 Apr 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-0418, via World News Connection) 
 
Meanwhile, Baltic officials continue to face obstacles as they gear up their 
countries for the alliance's decision. An increase in defense spending -- one 
virtual prerequisite for continued consideration as a NATO candidate -- has 
Estonian PM Mart Laar less than optimistic. Raising the defense budget to 2 
percent of GDP, which NATO members have made clear is the minimum needed 
to bring Estonia's military in line, is a contentious proposal for the cash-strapped 
country. "I can already picture the kind of debate spiced with populistic 
arguments that will arise on this issue in parliament," Laar said on 14 April at the 
Fatherland Alliance party congress. This year's decision to raise defense 
allotments to 1.8 percent of the gross domestic product was difficult but 
inevitable, he said. "We got away with it, while avoiding artificially inflating our 
budget, actually lowering the tax burden and keeping the budget in balance," 
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Laar explained. (BNS, 1235 GMT, 14 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0414, via World 
News Connection)  
 
Lithuania, too, is trying to meet the defense budget hurdle and NATO members, 
while being helpful, have shown no inclination to let that requirement slide. 
During a recent trip to Vilnius, Lewis Moonie, the UK's parliamentary under-
secretary of state on defense, reminded Lithuanian officials that their country's 
pledge to increase military spending to 2 percent of GDP next year remained an 
important part of preparing for NATO membership. Moonie told Lithuanian 
Defense Minister Linas Linkevicius that, while in the capital, he would review 
Lithuania's emergency management, conscription system and defense planning. 
The UK has been providing Lithuania with long-term consultations since 1994 
and British officials have been serving in the Lithuanian defense ministry for 
short-term stints. British experts have helped with policy and budget planning. 
(BNS, 1642 GMT, 24 Apr 01 ; FBIS-SOV-2001-0424, via World News 
Connection) 
 
The Baltic states also are receiving assistance from newer NATO members. 
Lieutenant General Jiri Sedivy, chief of the General Staff of the Czech Army, 
recently proposed an expansion of training and an increase of material 
assistance, according to Raimonds Graube, commander of the Latvian Armed 
Forces. So far, Latvia has received guns, mortars, three tanks and other 
equipment from the Czech Republic, and is interested in Czech recovery vehicles 
and spare parts for equipment on hand. Sedivy also confirmed that spare parts 
and ammunition will be supplied. (LETA, 1026 GMT, 12 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0412, via World News Connection) Later that week, General Sedivy traveled to 
Vilnius, where he met with Lithuania's chief of staff, Jonas Kronkaitis. Lithuania 
was interested in the Czech Army's modernization program, especially the 
passive monitoring system, according to a spokesman for the Czech defense 
ministry. Kronkaitis also met Czech Defense Minister Vladimir Vetchy, who 
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offered spots at Czech military academies to Lithuanian Army officers. (CTK, 
1319 GMT, 17 Apr 01; FBIS-EEU-2001-0417, via World News Connection) 
 
Such support apparently is making a difference. In addition to the recently voiced 
support from NATO member leaders, other persons rating the aspiring countries 
have produced positive comments. At a North Atlantic Council meeting in 
Brussels, 12 NATO ambassadors assessed as "impressive" indications of 
Latvia's defense and macroeconomic development. Prime Minister Andris 
Berzins and Defense Minister Girts Valdis Kristovskis described Latvia's progress 
towards NATO membership and answered questions that concerned primarily 
the Baltic country's relations with Russia, as well as public integration, 
naturalization and privatization. (BNS, 1714 GMT, 23 Apr 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0424, via World News Connection) 
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